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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Katherine Smith appeals from the district court's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order wherein the district court denied Ms. Smith post-conviction relief. 
Ms. Smith appeals the district court's order summarily dismissing her claim that she 
received ineffective assistance of counsel, resulting in her plea being not knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently entered. As a result, she asks this Court to reverse the 
district court's order summarily dismissing this case and remand the matter for further 
proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Smith filed a timely Petition for Post-Conviction relief. (R., pp.4-7.) She 
asserted several claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel. 1 (R., pp.4-7.) 
Relevant to this appeal, Ms. Smith asserted that due to her attorney's deficient 
performance, she entered into an unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary plea at the 
arraignment. (R., pp.16-18.) Ms. Smith seeks to withdraw her guilty plea and proceed 
forward to trial; wherein, she contends she has good defenses to the charges. 
(R., pp.6, 24.) Ms. Smith contends she is innocent. (Tr., p.144, Ls.20-23, p.144, Ls.12-
17.) 
Ms. Smith asserted that her attorney accepted a retainer months before the State 
filed charges. (R., p.16.) At the time of retaining her attorney, she provided him checks, 
cash receipts, register receipts, and other evidence to assist her defense. (R., p.16.) 
1 Although Ms. Smith raised several claims in her petition, counsel is only addressing 
the claim relevant to the issue being raised in this appeal. 
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Ms. Smith contends that the trial attorney failed to properly review the evidence she 
provided prior to making false promises and coercing her into a plea agreement. 
{R., pp.16, 25.) 
Ms. Smith contends that her attorney promised probation and insured her that 
the State would not prosecute her daughter and husband. (R., pp.16, 18.) Specifically, 
Ms. Smith claimed, "Mr. Martens made the false promise of three (3) years probation 
with a withheld judgment. At no time did Mr. Martens say that tr1is was his opinion. He 
stated it as a fact to Mr. and Mrs. Smith." (R., p.18.) In an attempt to clarify her claim to 
the state bar, Ms. Smith asserted, "At no time have I claimed he forced me to do 
anything. What I said is that if I had been properly informed, with the truth, I would not 
have proceeded the way he wanted." {R., p.42.) 
Ms. Smith also filed a copy of her state bar complaint. (R., pp.20-28.) In her 
complaint, she asserted that her attorney told her at a hearing that he had a deal 
worked out (R., p.23.) According to Ms. Smith, if she pied guilty to three of the 
charges, she would receive three years probation. (R., p.23.) The State agreed to 
dismiss the remaining seven counts and have her immediately released from jail on her 
own recognizance. (R., p.23.) Ms. Smith also stated that when she told her attorney 
that she did not understand, he told her that he would tell her how to respond to the 
court's questions. (R., p.23.) Ms. Smith recalled that during the hearing, because she 
did not understand why she was pleading to certain offenses that she had proof of her 
innocence, she stopped the judge and asked questions of her trial attorney. (R., p.23; 
Tr.04/02/2004, p.12, Ls.10-20.) Her attorney's response was that it was not relevant 
and that she would not go home today if she objected to the plea. (R., p.23.) 
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In a written response to the state bar, the trial attorney stated: 
I was of the opinion that she would receive no jail time, the Judge would 
give her probation and time served leaving her on probation for three 
years fixed and five indeterminate. Sentencing was open, so I could only 
give Mrs. Smith my opinion and what I believed her sentence would be. I 
did qualify my opinion to Mrs. Smith. I explained to her that everything 
depended on the pre-sentence investigation, so it was important that the 
report come back good. 
(R., p.35.) Ms. Smith takes issue with the trial attorney's qualification that his advice to 
her was presented to her as only an opinion. (R., pp.42-43.) 
The State filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
(R., pp.157-160) and an Amended Notice (R., pp.161-164). The district court conducted 
a hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal on May 29, 2009. (R., pp.175-
182.) After hearing argument, the district court dismissed all but one of Ms. Smith's 
claims. (R., pp.183-184.) Ms. Smith's claim on appeal that her plea was not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered due to ineffective assistance of counsel was 
summarily dismissed by the court. (R., pp.183-184.) 
The district court conducted a hearing on the one remaining claim involving 
whether Ms. Smith received ineffective assistance of counsel when her attorney 
allegedly instructed her to leave the sentencing hearing. (R., pp.191-195.) The district 
court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R., pp.198-206.) Pursuant to the 
prisoner mailbox rule, Ms. Smith filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.207-210, 228.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Ms. Smith's claim that her plea 
was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily because it was the result of 
ineffective assistance of counsel? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Ms. Smith's Claim That Her Plea 
Was Not Entered Knowingly, Intelligently, Or Voluntarily Because It Was The Result Of 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Smith asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed her 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in her unknowing, unintelligent, and 
involuntary plea. Ms. Smith presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
she received ineffective assistance of counsel. Ms. Smith respectfully requests that the 
district court's order summarily dismissing her ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
involving her guilty plea be vacated, and this case remanded to the district court for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
1. Summary Dismissal Standards 
An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 
138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified 
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. 
The application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its 
allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id. 
The court may summarily dismiss a petition for relief when the court is satisfied 
the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by further 
proceedings. I.C. § 19-4906(b). In considering summary dismissal in a case where 
evidentiary facts are not disputed, summary dismissal may be appropriate, despite the 
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possibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be responsible for 
resolving the conflict between the inferences. See State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 
444 (2008) (addressing the case where State did not file a response to petition) (citing 
Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519 (1982) (addressing the case with 
stipulated facts)). However, where the facts are disputed, a court is required to accept 
the petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true, but need not accept the 
petitioner's conclusions. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). 
Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if there exists a 
material issue of fact. I.C. § 19-4906. When genuine issues of material fact exist that 
would entitle the applicant to relief, if resolved in the applicant's favor, summary 
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Baldwin v. 
State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008). 
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction 
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the 
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a 
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court 
determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho 903 
(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de nova. Owen v. 
State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997). 
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2. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Standards 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant 
in a criminal case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of 
counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). Further, the 
Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the 
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685. 
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's 
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on 
the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's 
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the 
Amendment envisions." Id. The "proper measure of attorney performance remains 
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. In light of the Sixth 
Amendment's reliance upon the legal profession's standards, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated that the starting point of evaluating criminal defense counsel's conduct is the 
American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 27 4, 279 ( 1998). 
In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also 
must prove that he was prejudiced. "The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). 
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
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outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct 
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by 
Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), 
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding 
would have been different, that decision would be "diametrically different," 
"opposite in character or nature," and "mutually opposed" to our clearly 
established precedent because we held in Strickland that the prisoner 
need only demonstrate a "reasonable probability that · · · the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." 
Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). 
Despite the general rule, a presumption of prejudice arises in certain instances. 
This presumption applies when there is a complete denial of counsel during a critical 
stage of the proceedings, when circumstances are such that the likelihood that any 
lawyer could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is 
appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial, and when counsel entirely 
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. See e.g., 
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,659 (1984). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Ms. Smith's Claim That 
Her Plea Was Not Entered Knowingly, Intelligently, Or Voluntarily Because It 
Was The Result Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Ms. Smith asserted that her plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily 
entered because it was the product of her attorney's failure to investigate, failure to 
pursue defenses to the charge, threats of family member's prosecution, and untrue 
promises about the plea bargain. {R., pp.4-7, 16-18, 23, 25, 42.) The district court 
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dismissed this claim after the hearing on the State's motion to dismiss. (R., pp.183-
184.) The court determined that even if the attorney improperly advised Ms. Smith 
about the potential consequences of her plea, the district court judge was so complete 
and thorough at the change of plea hearing, Ms. Smith could never prove a claim that 
her plea was not knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily entered. (Tr.05/29/2009, p.83, 
L.10 - p.82, L7.) 
Ms. Smith submits that the district court erred when it relied upon the records of 
the taking of her guilty plea, to the exclusion of other evidence regarding the 
circumstances of the entry of the plea, to determine that the plea was knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered. When all the evidence is considered, Ms. Smith 
did offer sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
her plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered such that she is entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing on this claim. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, "It is elementary that a 
coerced plea is open to collateral attack." Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 215 
(1973). This is true even when a petitioner bases his claims on things that occurred 
prior to the taking of the plea and informed the court, at the time the plea was entered, 
that it was "given voluntarily and knowingly, that he understood the nature of the charge 
and the consequences of the plea, and that he was in fact guilty." Id. at 213-214. 
Although the objective of following Idaho Criminal Rule 11 procedures is to flush out and 
resolve issues regarding the plea, "like any procedural mechanism, its exercise is 
neither always perfect nor uniformly invulnerable to subsequent challenge calling for an 
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opportunity to prove the allegations" of coercion. Cf. Id. at 215 (addressing Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 11 ). 
Although the record of guilty plea proceedings is relevant to a subsequent claim 
that the plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily, "the barrier of the 
plea or sentencing proceeding record, although imposing, is not invariably 
insurmountable." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (U.S.N.C. 1977). In 
administering the writ of habeas corpus: 
federal courts cannot fairly adopt a per se rule excluding all possibility that 
a defendant's representations at the time his guilty plea was accepted 
were so much the product of such factors as misunderstanding, duress, or 
misrepresentation by others as to make the guilty plea a constitutionally 
inadequate basis for imprisonment. 
Id. at 75. This Court sees the "Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act as an expansion 
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and not as a denial of the same." See Dionne v. State, 93 
Idaho 235, 237 (1969). In addressing post conviction claims regarding the nature of a 
plea, this Court has not adopted a per se rule limiting review to the record of the 
proceedings at which the plea was taken, to the exclusion of additional evidence of what 
led to the entry of the plea. See McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847 (2004) (considering 
evidence outside of the written plea agreement to determine whether plea was entered 
as the result of ineffective assistance of counsel). 
In limiting its consideration of whether Ms. Smith entered a knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary plea to the record of the taking of the plea, to the exclusion of other 
evidence in the post conviction record regarding the circumstances of the entry of the 
plea, the district court erred. 
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The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that a claim that a guilty 
plea is invalid because it was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered into may 
be raised in a post-conviction petition. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 
(1970). 
Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea 
process and enters her plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness 
of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice "was within the range of 
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 
(1970). As we explained in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 
1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973), a defendant who pleads guilty upon the 
advice of counsel "may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character 
of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was 
not within the standards set forth in McMann." Id., at 267, 93 S.Ct., at 
1608. 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985). 
Taking Ms. Smith's factual allegations as true, the advice counsel gave to 
Ms. Smith regarding entering a plea was not within the range of competence demanded 
of attorneys in a criminal case. Ms. Smith asserted that her attorney told her that if "she 
did not plead guilty and do exactly as he instructed, that Mr. Smith [her husband at the 
time] and her daughter were going to be charged with various charges." (R., p.16.) The 
prosecutor does not dispute that this threat could have been made by the attorney. 
(R., p.148.) The State argues that the threat could not undermine a guilty plea because 
it could be a matter of the attorney's opinion or a matter of "simple truth." (R., p.148.) 
However, threats that one daughter and/or husband will be going to jail certainly does 
raise a question of whether the plea was voluntarily entered into. Threats of harm to a 
family member certainly could undermine whether a plea was voluntarily entered into 
and this issue should have proceeded forward to an evidentiary hearing. 
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Ms. Smith also asserted that her attorney made false promises about the plea 
bargain. (R., p.18.) She alleged that he told her that she would receive three years 
probation with a withheld judgment. (R., p.18.) In further elaboration to the bar 
association, Ms. Smith explained that: 
Jared Martens told me that he had a deal worked out because this was 
the best that I could hope for. The deal was told to me as follows = I 
would be released on O.R., they would drop 7 of the 10 if I would plead to 
the remaining 3, no jail time and three years probation. I told Jared 
Martens that I did not understand and he told me that he would tell me 
how to answer. At some point[,] I stopped the judge and tried to ask Jared 
Martens why he had me pleading guilty to charges that I have proof of and 
he told me "that isn't relevant now, just do as I told you or you won't go 
home today." 
(R., p.23 (emphasis added).) In review of the change of plea hearing transcript, 
Ms. Smith did in fact try to stop the hearing. (Tr.04/02/2004, p.12, Ls.15-23.) She 
discussed the matter with her attorney and when questioning resumed, she answered 
accordingly. (Tr.04/02/2004, p.12, Ls.18-23.) Ms. Smith had already been informed 
that she had better do as the attorney said or her family members would be prosecuted. 
(R., p.16.) 
Ms. Smith also indicated that her attorney promised her a withheld judgment and 
three years probation. {R., pp.16, 23.) The attorney's opinion of the plea bargain is 
interesting. {R., p.35.) In a formal response to the State Bar Association, he claims that 
he thought, "she would receive no jail time, the Judge would give her probation and time 
served leaving her on probation for three years fixed and five indeterminate." (R., p.35.) 
First, Ms. Smith has presented a genuine issue of fact because she believed that her 
attorney had a deal worked out, not as the attorney recalls that his "deal" offer was only 
an opinion of the possible consequences. Second, the attorney's recitation of his 
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opinion is an illogical impossibility. There is no such thing as probation for "three years 
fixed and five indeterminate." While certainly an underlying sentence of eight years is 
possible, there is no such thing as a fixed and indeterminate probation. While, certainly 
there may be a typographical error, it only further supports Ms. Smith's version of the 
facts and that at a minimum she presented a material issue of fact that her plea was not 
knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered. Moreover, the attorney's belief that the 
result of the presentence investigation could change everything would be consistent 
with either Ms. Smith's allegations and/or the attorney's denial of improper advice. 
Ms. Smith also alleged that her attorney failed to properly advise her to plead 
guilty because he did not review her discovery and determine whether or not she had 
any legal defenses to the charges. (R., pp.25-26.) While the attorney claimed that he 
reviewed the documents she provided approximately one year before she pied guilty, he 
did not indicate whether he re-reviewed it, considered it in light of the State's discovery, 
and considered Ms. Smith's defenses prior to suggesting that she plead guilty to the 
charge. (R., pp.35, 38.) Essentially, the attorney's billing records reveal that he may 
have reviewed the evidence on May 15, 2003, and nearly a year later reviewed the 
State's evidence on March 17, 2004. (R., p.38.) It is highly questionable if the attorney 
would remember all of the potential defenses from a case delivered to him a year prior 
and keep that information mentally assessable when evaluating a case that a defendant 
had full attentions of fighting. (R., p.38.) 
Ms. Smith asserted that she was coerced by the attorney to plead guilty, she had 
been given false promises about a plea bargain, had been threaten with family 
member's prosecution, and instructed to say what the attorney wanted her to say. 
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Taking the unrebutted factual assertions of Ms. Smith as true, as a result of counsel's 
ineffective assistance of counsel in this case, counsel's advice to plead guilty was not 
within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. As a result, 
Ms. Smith's plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered. Thus, there is a 
genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in Ms. Smith's favor, would entitle 
Ms. Smith to relief such that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed this 
claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Smith respectfully requests that the district court's order summarily 
dismissing her claim be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 26th day of March, 2012. 
-·{\?'DIANE M. WALKER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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